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LIBERALISM LOST 
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE. By Stanley Fish.1 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1999. 328 
pp. $14.95. 
Daniel A. Farbel 
In his latest book, Stanley Fish attacks liberal political 
theory in general and First Amendment theory in particular.1 To 
read this book is not merely to encounter a critique of liberalism 
but to confront Fish himself, as a forceful polemical presence. In 
his earlier writings about literary theory, Fish observed that the 
reader actively participates in bringing a work to life.4 In that 
spirit, what follows is a reader's encounter with The Trouble with 
Principle and with the "author"-not the real human being 
whose picture appears on the back cover, but the author who 
emerges from the text itself. 
Imagine then a room at twilight. A balding man with 
an intense look sits in a leather chair next to a reading 
lamp. From the shadows, a voice is heard. As the dia-
logue proceeds, the shadows gradually darken. (Itali-
cized passages within the dialogue are quotations from 
The Trouble with Principle.) 
Reader: Hello, Dean Fish. May I call you Stanley? I feel as 
if I know you, which I suppose in a sense I do, since you're the 
I. Dean of College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, 
University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Dianne Farber, 
David McGowan, Mike Paulsen, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful criticisms. 
3. "Liberal" here, by the way, refers to philosophical liberalism, which includes 
everyone from Richard Epstein and Robert Nozick, to Frank Michclman and John 
Rawls. 
4. The "reader response" theory is applied to Milton in Stanley Fish, Surprised by 
Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost (Harvard U. Press, 1996), and developed more gcner· 
ally in Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Com· 
munities 21-67 (Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
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authorial voice I've drawn from the text. There's a lot I agree 
with in your views: our need to act morally despite unresolvable 
uncertainties, your call for a pragmatic approach to the First 
Amendment, and your skepticism that political philosophy can 
provide much help in resolving hard questions. But I find your 
prose style a little off-putting-as if I had been cornered at a 
party by a very interesting person who is also very loud and un-
relenting. There's also a lot of what you say that I find puz-
zling-which is partly Minnesotan for saying that I strongly dis-
agree and partly a reflection of genuine puzzlement. I thought 
maybe we could start by discussing the relationship between 
theory and practice, which is one aspect of your thought that I 
honestly don't understand. 
Stanley: I've always believed that theory had nothing to do 
with practice. Theory is just the professional practice of theo-
rists, which has nothing to do with the rest of life. The truth is 
that neither the benefits nor the troubles of professional practices 
come along with us when we leave their precincts and enter an-
other. (p. 302) So my years of work on Milton changed my Mil-
ton scholarship but otherwise were completely irrelevant to my 
life. True, I was a Milton scholar by profession, but that meant 
only that I had the kind of understanding [that] qualifies one to 
be an authority on Milton .... [W]hen I did decide about what 
Milton believed, the decision led me not to live my life differently 
than I had before but to interpret Milton differently than I had be-
fore. (p. 273) 
Reader: You're speaking in the past tense. Did something 
change? 
Stanley: Yes, not that long ago. My own thoughts ... coa-
lesce around a moment in a Milton seminar I taught several years 
ago. The students were discoursing glibly (as my example had in-
structed them) about some matter or other-the intricacies of 
Milton's verse, or the import of his allusions to Virgil-and I 
without thinking burst out "No, no, he doesn't want your admira-
tion; he wants your soul!" Was this a professional comment? ... 
Had something happened to me of which I was only dimly aware? 
Was I in danger (or in hope) of no longer being an authority and 
becoming something else? God only knows. (p. 275) 
Reader: I found that a very dramatic, intriguing passage-
l'm glad you included it in the book. I do wonder if you've 
worked through its implications completely. Have you noticed 
any changes in yourself since then? 
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Stanley: Yes, my speech patterns seem to have changed. As 
you know, I'm the world's leading Milton expert, but now I can't 
seem to stop quoting his poetry, even when the subject is some-
thing seemingly unrelated like contemporary First Amendment 
scholarship or liberal political theory. 
Reader: As a layperson, I found the references interesting 
though sometimes difficult to follow. Sometimes, though, 
bringing in Milton worked wonderfully. For example, I loved it 
where you compared philosophical inquiry to "Milton's fallen 
angels who try to reason about fate, foreknowledge, and free will 
and find themselves 'in wandering mazes lost."' (p. 63) Very 
nice! 
Stanley: Yes, but my Milton-mania may be a bit out of con-
trol. Here's an example. I discuss a First Amendment scholar 
named Rod Smolla and comment that some of his phrases don't 
seem to fit the logic of the First Amendment but instead seem to 
represent meaningless fragments of a different morality. Of 
course that reminds me of a passage from Milton. Smolla calls 
to mind a fallen angel. Particularly, the inability of the fallen an-
gels ... to produce sentences that do not fall apart in their mouths. 
Having severed their connection with the only source of value in 
the universe, they are reduced to saying things like we are "Surer 
to prosper than prosperity I Could have as sur' d us ... " (p. 78) 
Smolla is just as incoherent. It would be as hard put to assign a 
meaning to "sure" or "prosperity" in Satan's utterance as we are 
to assign meaning ... [to] Smolla's. (p. 78) 
Reader: Apart from the fact that you're drawing on Milton, 
I notice that you seem to verge on demonizing the opposition 
there. At least indirectly, you seem to be comparing traditional 
First Amendment scholars and their utterances to Satan. (When 
I write this up, I wonder if I can work in a reference to Rushdie's 
Satanic Verses here.) Is the theological comparison apt? 
Stanley: The similarity runs very deep, as you can see from 
Paradise Lost. The First Amendment demands disinterested 
judgment about the permissibility of speech, but truly disinter-
ested judgment is an impossibility: judgment without partiality-
judgment delivered from nowhere and everywhere-is not an op-
tion for human beings and is available only to Gods and ma-
chines. The strong First Amendment promise is the promise that 
Satan made to Adam and Eve, that we shall be as Gods. . . . (p. 
113) 
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Reader: But even if they're wrong, don't you think that First 
Amendment scholars might have a reasonable point of view? 
Stanley: "Listen to both sides" -what an empty platitude. I 
know that a lot of people think that the very existence of oppo-
nents who are as well-educated and (in most things) as sensible as 
oneself is a reason for relaxing the aggressiveness of one's polemi-
cal assertions-the logic is "Maybe they know something I don't 
know" or "Maybe God knows something neither of us knows"-
but if it is a reason for anything, it is a reason for wonder at the 
persistence of error, even on the part of those who have had all the 
educational advantages. That there is resistance by well-
credentialed persons to your own views is a (regrettable) political 
fact from which no moral or normative conclusions follows, un-
less of course among the resisters are some whose words and 
writings you regard as holy writ. (p. 290) 
Reader: Wow, I wish I were that self-confident! Your view 
of the First Amendment seems to mirror your attitude toward 
academic debate in an interesting way. I don't know whether to 
think that you're projecting your own adversarial personality on 
the world at large or whether you're being admirably coherent in 
unifying your own scholarly style, your personality, and your 
general theories. But I'm also not sure how serious you are 
about this "talking as warfare" thing. You really don't think you 
might be able to learn something from a dialogue with those on 
the other side? 
Stanley: The idea of learning something from the other side 
is one of the fallacies I've tried to expose. [N]arrow partiali-
ties ... will always inform the activities of human actors. And by 
the same reasoning, communication is not a vehicle for harmo-
nizing those partialities-not, as Habermas would have it be, a 
cooperative venture. Rather, it is a competitive one, and the prize 
in the competition is the (temporary) right to label your way of 
talking "undistorting," a label you can claim only until some other 
way of talking, some other vocabulary elaborated with a superior 
force, takes it away from you. (p. 306) By the way, have I men-
tioned how much I detest Habermas? As far as I am concerned, 
any positive reference to Habermas in the course of an argument 
is enough to invalidate it. (p. 122) 
Reader: I guess I'll let Habermas defend himself. Don't go 
away, though, I promise not to include any positive references to 
him in this dialogue. You seem to view communication as ad-
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versarial. It's understandable, given your view of communica-
tion, that you don't believe in the marketplace of ideas. 
Stanley: The marketplace of ideas is an abomination. It 
leaves decisions up to everyone and therefore no one. [B]ecause 
none of us is a god some of us must decide, lest the imperatives of 
the mora/life be given over to forces-called the marketplace of 
ideas-that are accountable to no one and bound to no vision ex-
cept the antivision of chance and random fate. (p. 92) 
Reader: But shouldn't people be willing to put their ideas 
forward to be criticized and assessed? That kind of free debate 
is what is captured by the marketplace metaphor. 
Stanley: Free debate isn't necessarily a bad value, but it's a 
value like any other. There is no reason to expect everyone to 
share it. In fact, it's mostly a value held by people who don't 
have any strong substantive convictions and therefore don't care 
much about winning or losing. The world looks quite different 
to someone with powerful convictions, most notably to the true 
religious believer. To put the matter baldly, a person of religious 
conviction should not want to enter the marketplace of ideas but 
to shut it down, at least insofar as it presumes to determine matters 
that he believes have been determined by God and faith. The re-
ligious person should not seek an accommodation with liberalism; 
he should seek to rout it from the field. (p. 250) Religion can't 
really compete in the so-called marketplace with secular ideas 
because they are based on entirely different ways of looking at 
the world. It is a tenet of liberal Enlightenment faith that belief 
and knowledge are distinct and separable and that even if you do 
not embrace a point of view, you can still understand it. This is 
the credo Satan announces in Paradise Regained . . . . (p. 247) 
Reader (aside): I gather that one of his objections to free 
speech is that it's relativist. As Stanley says somewhere, saying 
all viewpoints are alike is akin to the mentality that finds no dif-
ference between wearing rings on your finger and inserting rings 
into your penis. (p. 28) But I wonder whether requiring a par-
ticular actor-the government-to remain neutral is really the 
same as moral relativism?.... Enough of substance-back to 
style! 
Reader: "[T]he credo Satan announces in Paradise Re-
gained." (p. 247) Old Scratch seems to come up quite a bit in 
your discussions. (Actually, I'm beginning to wonder whether 
your position is postmodern or pre-modern.) You were talking 
about the role of the truly religious, or I assume others with 
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strong substantive views. (Or do you consider religion to be a 
special case, as you seem to indicate on pages 296 to 297, where 
you say religion has the only vocabulary that resists pragmatist 
deconstruction?) Shouldn't the religious person be willing to 
live in a liberal society, where religion is not a matter of state 
mandate? 
Stanley: That's the last thing that someone with true relig-
ious views would want. He should want an end to the pub-
lidprivate split which, by fencing off the arena of political dispute 
from substantive determinations of value, assures the continual 
deferral and bracketing of value questions. He should want what 
Milton wants, a unified conception of life in which the pressure of 
first principles is felt and responded to twenty-four hours a day. 
(p.253) 
Reader: "[W]hat Milton wants." Didn't you just use the 
present tense in reference to Milton's views? 
Stanley: Yes, I guess I did. Slip of the tongue. 
Reader: Very interesting. Milton does seem to be a real 
presence in this conversation, doesn't he? I'd bring him in on a 
three-way call, but I don't think I could pull it off. (And maybe I 
don't need to "bring him in" anyway.) Anyway, you were 
speaking about the public/private distinction. What's wrong 
with it? 
Stanley: What is not allowed religion under the private public 
distinction is the freedom to win, the freedom not to be separate 
from the state but to inform and shape its every action. (p. 254) 
Reader: Again, you don't seem very open to the idea of 
dialogue. I'm interested in your tendency to analyze the world 
in terms of transcendental battles between radically opposing 
forces. Isn't some kind of accommodation, rather than battle to 
the death, a possibility in social life? Even for those like the 
truly religious, who have powerful viewpoints of their own? 
Stanley: Here is what truly religious people would demand: 
not the inclusion of religious discourse in a debate no one is al-
lowed to win but the triumph of religious discourse and the si-
lencing of its atheistic opponents. (p. 261) Religion can't com-
promise any more than God could compromise with Satan. 
Reader: So while liberalism purports to be fair, it isn't be-
cause it rules out in advance the possibility of a victory by the 
other side? 
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Stanley: Fairness! [Fjairness-the impartial treatment of all 
points of view no matter what their substantive content-is the lib-
eral's virtue; it is liberals who wish to push conflict off the public 
stage in favor of a polite and endless conversation in which every-
one has his or her say in the confidence that not very much, and 
certainly not anything really disturbing, will come of it. (p. 221) 
But of course, liberals don't have any real substantive values 
anyway. Strong believers, however, have another goal. They 
aren't concerned that the conversation continue and display the 
widest possible participation; they want the conversation to take a 
certain turn and stay there. They don't want to be fair, they want 
to be victorious, and they won't have a chance of victory if they 
spend their time fighting over title to their opponents' vocabulary. 
(p. 221) 
Reader: I'm a little confused. Don't religious believers want 
fair treatment? 
Stanley: They only do if they fall into the trap of liberalism. 
In the eyes of a democratically reasonable person, what is owed to 
the strong religious believer is fairness, but fairness is not what the 
strong religious believer wants; what he wants is a world ordered 
in accordance with the faith he lives by and would die for, and lib-
eral democracy (or pragmatism) isn't going to give him that, ever. 
(p. 298) Fairness is a liberal canard, a philosophy for those 
whose beliefs are weak. 
Reader (aside): This is actually beginning to make liberal 
theory sound a bit better to me. It sounds to me like, according 
to Fish, the religious have no real ground of complaint that they 
can raise within liberalism. In other words, they may have no 
basis for invoking liberal concepts such as constitutional rights. 
So the liberal could be right in saying that restricting socially 
dangerous religious practices doesn't violate the constitutional 
rights of participants. In response, the participants can say that 
they are morally right to act nonetheless and the state is morally 
wrong to intercede. But what the participants can't authentically 
say, while staying within their own worldview, is that their con-
stitutional rights are being violated, because that is a concept 
that only makes sense within liberalism itself. So in fact, the lib-
eral is right to reject their constitutional claim. But does Stanley 
really mean what he says about fairness? Let's test this a little 
further. 
Reader: So you don't think much of fairness either? You 
seem to feel that it's a trap devised by these liberal theorists 
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whom you are so worried about-a trap you have avoided 
somehow or another. 
Stanley: Fairness is the virtue that mitigates against winning 
(p. 240) That's what's wrong with liberalism. Immorality resides 
in the mantras of liberal theory-fairness, impartiality, and mu-
tual respect-all devices for painting the world various shades of 
grey. (p. 242) 
Reader (aside): The reference to "winning" is interesting. 
Stanley mentions somewhere the idea that liberalism could have 
a Hobbesian justification, in a world where in fact no one has the 
power to "win" but everyone has the collective power to "lose" 
by reducing the world to constant warfare. (p. 109) This sounds 
to me like a kind of Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which the trick 
is to devise ways to maintain cooperative strategies. But I sup-
pose it wouldn't be fair to ask an English professor, even one 
who has also been a sometime professor of law, to discuss game 
theory. I must make a note, though, to write up the idea of lib-
eralism as a kind of "tit-for-tat" strategy. How rude of me, 
though, to keep Stanley waiting while I go off on these tangents. 
Reader: Sorry, I was woolgathering. You just said that lib-
eralism was immoral because it was a device for painting the 
world in shades of gray. I must say that you don't seem to be 
prone to fine gradations yourself. 
Stanley: Seeing shades of gray merely weakens one for the 
struggle. Shades of gray are never honored in the world of John 
Milton, where the only question is whether you stand in the light 
with God or in the dark with Satan. (p. 243) 
Reader: Milton, again. Sometimes it seems unclear whether 
it is our world or Milton's you are discussing. Are we talking 
about the 17th century or the dawn of the 21st? Am I talking to 
him or to you, I almost wonder. Or is it all the same? Anyway, 
you seem to favor Milton's view of religion over those of many 
religious people today. But aren't there contemporary religious 
views that are compatible with liberal democracy? 
Stanley: You could call them religious, I suppose, in some 
watered-down sense or another. To be sure, those religions that 
put "openness of mind" at the center of their faith-or rather at 
the center of their rejection of faith-will be welcomed into the 
political process and accorded a role in American public life, but 
only because in their stripped down and soft-edged form they are 
indistinguishable from other Enlightenment projects and are 
hardly religious at all. (p. 189) 
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Reader (aside): Is it problematic that he's purporting to de-
cide for other people what it means to be religious? This seems 
to make Khomeni the paradigm religious figure. In that case, it's 
no wonder that liberal society can't really accommodate such 
people. 
Reader: You don't seem to think that liberalism is capable 
of tolerating true religion. But that's the whole point of liberal-
ism, I would think. Isn't liberalism based on tolerance even of 
radically different views? 
Stanley: Another canard. As I've said, liberal theory cannot 
tolerate real religion. Religions are not tolerant; that's why they 
are religions and not philosophical systems . ... Religious claims 
do not . . . respect any line between the private and the public. 
That is why liberalism cannot tolerate them; they violate its relig-
ion of tolerance. . . . (p. 297) 
Reader: If liberal theory cannot define the limits of toler-
ance, how is the line to be drawn? Who is to judge? 
Stanley: Who is to judge? How about the people whose job it 
is to judge-judges, administrators, mayors, governors, college 
presidents-all of those who by virtue of the positions they occupy 
have been assigned, and have accepted, the task of making deci-
sions even when the lines are not perfectly clear and they are less 
than infallible. (p. 91) 
Reader: You yourself are one of those people, a college 
administrator. What do you think about campus speech codes? 
Stanley: Liberals view hate speech as irrational and there-
fore a problem to be cured. This is wrong. If you think of hate 
speech as evidence of moral or cognitive confusion, you will try to 
clean the confusion up by the application of good reasons; but if 
you think that hate speakers, rather than being confused, are sim-
ply wrong-they reason well enough but their reasons are an-
chored in beliefs ... you abhor-you will not place your faith in 
argument but look for something stronger. (p. 71) 
Reader: So you don't think education or dialogue would 
help? These people are just "bad to the bone"? 
Stanley: The real question is strategic. Speech codes are a 
possible strategy. You can ask if in this situation, at this time and 
in this place, it would be reasonable to deploy them in the service 
of your agenda (which, again, is not to eliminate racism but to 
harass and discomfort racists). (pp. 71-72) 
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Reader: You seem inclined to personalize conflicts, with 
one side incorporating good and the other, to be fought to death, 
incorporating evil. It's not racism which is the enemy, but indi-
vidual bad people. No wonder you are so angry at those who 
disagree with you ... Actually, I'm still puzzled by the degree of 
your passion about issues of legal theory. Didn't you say earlier 
that it was your view that theory doesn't matter, outside of the 
confines of theory itself? 
Stanley: "Why am I so vehement about putting theory in its 
place?" .... The answer I would give is a political, not a theoreti-
cal one. Although the vocabulary of liberal theory is incoherent 
and empty (unless filled by the substantive judgments it pushes 
away) and cannot do the work (of clarifying, ordering, illuminat-
ing) claimed for it, it can nevertheless do work; and sometimes 
that work is, according to my lights, bad. (pp. 290-91) 
Reader: Sorry, I'm not sure I get that. Just what is the bad 
work that liberalism is supposed to do, and which you are bat-
tling against? 
Stanley: Liberalism frames issues in the wrong way. [T]he 
point of the theoretical terms that make up strong liberalism-jus-
tice, fairness, impartiality, mutual respect, autonomy, and on and 
on-is to de-emphasize historical considerations in favor of the 
abstract moral considerations that should always apply, no matter 
what the configuration and hierarchies of social and political 
forces. (p. 291) The eye is deflected away from the whole-his-
tory, culture, habitats, society-and the parts, now freed from any 
stabilizing context, can be described in any way one likes. (p. 
312) 
Reader (aside): I'm not sure what to make of this apparent 
demand for contextuality and pragmatism. It seems to fly in the 
face of the whole tone of the The Trouble With Principle, whose 
critique of liberalism is relentlessly abstract and ahistorical. 
Maybe inconsistency is a failing too common to be considered a 
major flaw. Yet his relentless anger at theory does seem at odds 
with his general belief in its irrelevance, something that is surely 
worth further probing. 
Reader: So your view, then, is that liberalism is deceptive? 
It persuades people to look at current employment practices like 
affirmative action without remembering the history of race in 
this society. (pp. 6-7) Why is it successful in its deception? 
Stanley: But why is the sleight of hand successful?, you ask. 
Why don't more people see through it? Because it is performed 
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with the vocabulary of America's civil religion-the vocabulary of 
equal opportunity, color-blindness, race neutrality, and, above all, 
individual rights. (p. 312) 
Reader: It seems that you've taken quite a battle upon 
yourself, doesn't it-Stanley versus the whole of the American 
civic religion? Is it really possible to change such widespread 
beliefs through argument? 
Stanley: Unclear. Sometimes I don't think so: It is simply 
too late in the day to go back. ... As someone once said, "Weal-
ready had the Enlightenment and religion lost. " The loss is not 
simply a matter of historical fact; it is inscribed in the very con-
sciousness of those who live in its wake. That is why we see the 
spectacle of men . . . . who set out to restore the priority of the 
good over the right but find the protocols of the right-of liberal 
proceduralism-written in the fleshly tables of their hearts. (p. 
262) Even those who should be most at odds with the Enlight-
enment seem powerless to resist its spell. 
Reader: That bit about "the fleshly tables of their hearts" is 
very neat, by the way. I'll bet if I were more erudite I would 
recognize it as a quotation, so it's doubly effective. Not only is it 
a great metaphor, but it puts the reader on the cultural defen-
sive. The bottom line, though, is your rejection of autonomy. 
Apparently, you don't think people have much control over their 
beliefs, if you view those beliefs as inscribed in their very flesh. 
Stanley: Autonomy, another liberal watchword, is a mirage. 
If autonomy is compromised by the shaping force of culture, and 
if consciousness cannot exist without having a shape it did not 
choose, and if our exposure to shaping forces increases as we get 
older, then what adulthood and maturity bring is not more but less 
autonomy, and not less but more indoctrination. (p. 160) Free-
dom of thought is a nice slogan, but it doesn't survive rigorous 
analysis. 
Reader: There doesn't seem to be much room for freedom 
of any kind in your vision of the world. It's admirable that 
you're able to battle on with such a fundamentally grim perspec-
tive on life. 
Stanley: The bottom line conclusion is that freedom has al-
ways and already been lost. (p. 159) 
Reader: Already lost, eh? Just like paradise? 
Stanley: Exactly. 
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The two fall silent. The reading light is turned out, and 
"Stanley" disappears into the same darkness as the "Reader." 
